

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP**

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
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8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
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16	NIO/AF		X		
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Remarks

Executive Secretary

Date

3637 (10-81)

19 Aug. 85

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Executive Registry

85- 3227

2

19 August 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Africa

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[REDACTED]

This, together with the amount of support the Soviets have put into Mozambique and Angola over the last year or so, and the Congressional action on the Clarke Amendment, suggests that perhaps the time has come to look at a new policy for Southern Africa. It might look something like this:

Angola - Shift to a US policy of support for the pro-western armed resistance movement of UNITA and its goals of a "National Unity government" with the least hard-core communist elements of the current government leading to genuinely democratic elections and the removal of the Cuban/Soviet bloc personnel.

Mozambique - Shift to a US policy of full support for the pro-western armed resistance, RENAMO, and work with friendly governments to bring about a "National Unity" coalition between RENAMO and the least pro-Soviet elements of the current communist government.

Namibia - Help the pro-democratic Namibian political groups to organize so that they can compete effectively in genuinely democratic elections to be held under supervision of an international commission of genuinely democratic countries--not the United Nations which has a conflict of interest, since it has already recognized the communist SWAPO guerrilla organization as "the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people".

Union of South Africa - Encourage peaceful evolution from the apartheid system while also assuring that the communist-led violent opposition groups are unable to bring a hostile, anti-western repressive dictatorship to power in the name of equal rights for all.

I attach some material Fred Wetters and John Helgeson have provided recently. I would like to get this updated along the lines I discussed with you this morning. I also attach a memorandum I sent to Graham Fuller, who will be back here tomorrow, designed to get additional material for the same broad purpose.



William J. Casey

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Attachments

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Executive Registry
85- 3226

19 August 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Emerging Troubles

1. It seems to me that we should resensitize the President and NSC principals on the combination of troubles we see as possibly emerging. This will bring up to date the story we developed in the Don Regan briefing. For this purpose I wonder if you could do the following:

- a. Update the very good paper you did on Iran about two months ago.
- b. Do a similar paper on the Syrian/Iranian/Libyan squeeze to surround Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon.
- c. Perhaps there should be a separate piece on Lebanon. See the attached article by Georgie Anne Geyer which appeared in this morning's Washington Times.
- d. Do an update on the piece you did on Sudan shortly after the one you did on Iran.

2. By the way, General Vessey and others were powerfully impressed by the letter you wrote for the Soviet Foreign Minister to Gorbachev. Vessey suggested you ought to write another one on advising the West how to respond to the new Jordan strategy for the Middle East.

/s/ William J. Casey

William J. Casey

Attachment

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THE WASHINGTON TIMES
19 August 1985

GEORGIE ANNE GEYER

Planned chaos in Lebanon?


Several years ago, some members of the Lebanese government of more-or-less President Amin Gemayel estimated the value of the shells and bullets expended on only one night of savage fighting there at \$5 million.

That kind of extraordinary outlay of money and weaponry — a development privately remarked upon with a kind of awe among analysts from Western Europe to the Middle East — is leading to some startling new speculation on what Lebanon really is all about.

Some of them are saying that, far from being an accidental or out-of-control war, Lebanon, on many levels, is a deliberate and planned chaos. As one analyst intimately connected with the war put it to me:

"The story not told is that this is an international war. It is the Spanish Civil War of our times. At stake are a number of things, from the fate of the Palestinians to whether the Soviets take over the whole area.

"One key area the Soviets did not control was Lebanon. Now, there is



The Lebanon war most definitely is being used and molded from outside, in particular by the Soviets.

Soviet control — but negatively." He paused for emphasis. "This is Vietnam II," he added.

What is important to watch in Lebanon is the sheer amount of weaponry and money for weaponry. This tells both the story and at the same time why this story is so dangerous that none of these analysts wanted to be quoted.

Basically, they agree on this argument:

Lebanon, with its longtime deli-

cate balance between factions, could have fallen apart into warring clans and sectors. But, without the little-reported and unprecedented international supply of arms, it would never have reached the stage of savagery that goes on day after day even now.

There are missiles launched from trucks, and they are shot off at the rate of 36 every half-minute. For the most common gun, the 152mm, every shell costs \$1,000. Private armies have D-72 tanks, which the Soviets give to some Warsaw Pact countries; and some Palestinian groups have helicopters.

The enormous preponderance of weapons comes across the Black Sea from the Soviet Union through the Bosphorus to land at such ports as Tyre and Latakia. Some come directly by land across Syria, again with Soviet markings.

Figures used by the Foreign and

Georgie Anne Geyer is a nationally syndicated columnist.

Commonwealth Office in London say that Syria, the Soviets' main foothold in the Arab world, heads the list of Soviet-arms recipients for the last five years. In 1983 alone, supplies to it were worth about \$1.7 billion.

One curiosity also little known is that the Soviets obtained about 20 percent of their hard currency earnings, again in 1983 alone, from repayments of principle and interest on arms sales in these countries.

So while the attention of the leaders of the world's traditionally organized countries (the United States and Western Europe) is focused on the "big" issues of nuclear arms and their control, it is telling that virtually no one is watching the supposedly "peripheral" area of Lebanon.

I called the prestigious International Institute of Strategic Studies in London and asked whether they had any information on the amounts of arms going into Lebanon.

"In a word, no," a military spokesman told me. "We watch the big stuff." Then he asked the key question: "How do you cover stuff from the Syrians to their proteges? From Iran to the Hezbollah? To Christians from Cyprus? Knowledgeable sources can't,

because the data is too scarce."

Because the entire Lebanon war is orchestrated in such an "irregular" manner, the constituted authority of the world cannot get a grip on it. And, indeed, that is precisely why it is orchestrated in such a way.

One caveat: it would be far too much to say that the entire Lebanon war, which now has gone on for 10 horrifying years, was planned from afar — from Moscow or Damascus. There are too many fissiparous protagonists in Lebanon.

But what begins to become clear when you separate some of the

strands of the Lebanon war is that it most definitely is being used and molded from outside, in particular by the Soviets, through their macabre arms input and the control that gives them.

The useful chaos of the moment can, then, in their eyes, lead to a quite different future, as yet unforeseen, one in which the Soviet Union plays a major role. The analysts also say, for instance, that the little-known Lebanese Communist Party increasingly is inserting itself into important posts.

The Spanish Civil War of our time? When one thinks about it, it doesn't seem as unlikely as it might sound at first.

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET				
SUBJECT: (Optional) <div style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.2em;">US/South Africa Relations</div>				
FROM: <div style="text-align: center;">Frederick L. Wettering NIO for Africa</div>		EXTENSION <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 50px; height: 20px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>	NO. <div style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.2em;">NIC #02910-85</div>	
		DATE <div style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.2em;">7 June 1985</div>		
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="width: 45%;">RECEIVED</div> <div style="width: 45%;">FORWARDED</div> </div>		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. VC/NIC			/	<div style="font-size: 1.2em;">1 to 5:</div> <p>I've asked Fred to rev up a quick, short, SNIE on prospects for South Africa. We will have a Concept Paper TOR for your consideration as soon as possible. In light of South Africa's role as key provider of raw materials to the West, and in light of the technological revolution in the field of materials sciences, we are hoping to include in our SNIE a box that will address the question of whether in coming years Western dependency on South Africa's mineral wealth will change, and the impact of this technological revolution on South African economy.</p> <div style="text-align: right; margin-top: 20px;"> Herbert E. Meyer </div>
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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #02910-85
7 June 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Frederick L. Wetters *FLW*
National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT: US/South Africa Relations

Recent conversations [redacted]

[redacted] as well as discussions with [redacted]
[redacted], have strengthened my belief that the US
policy community may not be paying sufficient attention to an emerging
trend in US/South Africa relations. A summary of my argument is as
follows:

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a. KEY JUDGMENT: The South African Government (SAG) increasingly appears to perceive the United States to be less relevant and less important to its short-term regional and domestic interests. While Pretoria will strive to maintain cordial bilateral relations, cooperate in intelligence sharing on Soviet Bloc activities, and keep their options open by listening to US diplomatic proposals, the Botha government is likely to become less responsive to US regional proposals and increasingly deaf to US requests, suggestions, and demands concerning South African domestic actions and policies. I anticipate that this trend will accelerate in coming months as Washington and Pretoria--both under political pressure at home--tailor their actions and statements to domestic constituencies. In sum, US leverage is likely to be decreasing at a time when US public interest in South Africa's domestic scene is increasing.

b. DISCUSSION: South African cooperation with US diplomatic efforts in the region has rested in large measure on Pretoria's belief that Washington is in a unique position to talk to all major parties and governments in the region. For the last four years and partly as a result of US diplomacy, however, South Africa has developed its own lines of communication with neighboring states and

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no longer need depend on the US to talk to Angola, Mozambique, or Zimbabwe. Moreover, South Africa increasingly questions the ability of the US to "deliver" these governments in any negotiated agreements.

In my judgment, the South Africans--at least for the short run--believe the US initiatives regarding Angola and Namibia are dead in the water and, as a consequence, Pretoria has developed alternative policies and strategies for pursuing its interests. In particular, they feel comfortable with pursuing on their own policies that will try to maintain lines of communication with the MPLA, increase support to UNITA, and develop a Namibian government and security force which may ultimately draw in SWAPO. (I believe the last of these is unlikely but that Pretoria believes it can be done.) In essence, Pretoria believes these policies meet its core security interests while rendering US efforts a useful, but not critically important, exercise. As such, South Africa can avoid taking positions or making statements that "embarrass" the SAG or force it to make potentially dangerous new concessions.

In Mozambique, South Africa supports our Mozambique initiative but increasingly sees itself as having been induced to extensively support a Machel regime whose survival prospects are increasingly suspect and whose commitment to the Nkomati process may be questionable as its political fortunes decline in the face of the RENAMO insurgency.

At home, the SAG has shown renewed determination to maintain control of the security situation as well as reassert a firm hand "guiding" black aspirations. In South African eyes, President Botha is offering extraordinary new concessions--at a breakneck pace--to expand the dialogue with blacks and permit greater black political participation. At the same time, we see a renewed ruthlessness in dealing with UDF oppositionists and the anarchic violence in the townships. I believe the government will not hesitate to turn more and more to such "stick" measures if they determine that is what is required to restore order in black townships and stop the coercion and intimidation of blacks who might otherwise support cooperation with the government. The likelihood that some of these measures will be directed against blacks who are perceived in the West to be legitimate political opposition forces is high given the SAG's historic difficulty of distinguishing between criticism and subversion.

Finally, a number of forthcoming measures from both Washington and Pretoria will increase the level of tension and widen the gulf between the two nations.

- Demonstrations and public criticism from prominent US figures and greater media attention will generate greater resentment in SAG government circles.

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- US measures, such as restricting exports to South Africa, limiting loans, or banning sale of Krugerrands cited in the Lugar or Grey bills, will provoke either direct or indirect South African reprisals. The SAG already has threatened (and then hedged) to expel one million guest workers from neighboring states, and reprisals against US companies of some sort--even to the level of petty harassment--can be anticipated.
- The SAG--citing the infringement on its sovereignty--is almost certain to forbid measures in the Lugar or Grey bills that call for Embassy mandatory enforcement of the Sullivan principles or the dispersal of millions of dollars in scholarships to South African blacks.
- In South Africa, further SAG arrests, detentions, intimations, and trials of nonwhite critics will provoke new outcries in the US. SAG covert attacks on ANC and PAC bases and personnel in neighboring states--which are likely to increase--will have the same result.
- SAG efforts to reassert control of rebellious black townships almost inevitably will create more bloody incidents. Given that the unrest is likely to continue over a long period of time, we can anticipate new and ongoing protests from US groups opposed to the South African government. The lack of SAG security force training in nonlethal control will only magnify the issue.

c. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US: I believe the still prevalent view in State that the SAG must come up with new concessions in order to keep the Namibia-Angola initiative visibly alive--particularly as a result of the South African fiasco in Cabinda--is erroneous and likely to lead to disappointment.

The policy thesis that we retain a unique role and an actual mandate to craft and promote solutions to regional southern African problems has been overtaken by events and no longer accurately reflects political realities in southern Africa.

While the SAG will still listen politely and selectively share information, they will feel much less compelled to respond to our prescriptions or requests for statements, gestures, concessions, or positive actions. As in the past when pressed, the government increasingly will look to its own counsel, claim the "outside" world doesn't understand, and stiffen and reaffirm its resolve to find a "South African" solution.

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This decreasing responsiveness will be clearest in the SAG's growing intolerance of US advice, suggestions, or lectures on how the SAG should handle its internal affairs. They will resist new and increased US Embassy involvement in SAG internal affairs and could even be tempted to curb existing US activities such as support to black trade unions, human rights organizations, or existing scholarship programs.

d. CONCLUSION: While I see some chilling and distancing in US-South African relations, I nonetheless see at least the possibility that useful bilateral relations can be maintained on many issues of mutual concern. This requires, however, that we accept at least for the moment that the SAG sees the US as of less relevance and importance and that Pretoria will be less responsive except when it serves its clear interests. In these areas, such as following and frustrating Soviet and Cuban activities in the area, cooperation can be sustained as long as both parties recognize that a new and evolving relationship is emerging.


Frederick L. Wettering

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ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL**Date**

4 June 1985

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number,
building, Agency/Post)**Initials****Date**

1. Acting DDI


2. Executive Registry

3. DDCI (has copy)

4. Director of Central Intelligence

5.

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

REMARKSDO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals,
clearances, and similar actions**FROM:** (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)
Director of African and
Latin American Analysis**Room No. Bldg.**
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OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
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☆ U. S. GPO: 1978-0-261-647-3354

DDI- 02861-85

4 June 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence *RKen*
FROM: John L. Helgerson
Director of African and Latin American Analysis
SUBJECT: Mozambique *8*

1. I am concerned about the policy implications of the deteriorating military and economic situation in Mozambique, and would like to bring you up to date on recent developments that have heightened our concern and what we are doing to improve our reporting for the policy community.

2. Over the past six months the RENAMO insurgency has gained ground and is now threatening a major attack on Maputo. Economic discontent is rising as the regime is unable to deal with its military and economic problems. The Portuguese, who recently have sent some high level visitors to Maputo, are extremely concerned about the desperation in Maputo, and report that Machel is threatened by at least two major groups of coup plotters--one made up of pro-Soviet hardliners, and another that is colluding with RENAMO.

3. I believe the South Africans are committed to the Nkomati process, but they too are becoming alarmed. Last week the deputy chief of my Africa Division, [redacted]

[redacted] reported there is a consensus in Pretoria that the situation in Maputo may be reaching crisis proportions. [redacted] was impressed with the unusual unanimity [redacted]

[redacted] on the severity of Machel's problems. [redacted] discussed Mozambique [redacted] provided a very gloomy assessment, [redacted]


4. I sent [redacted] over to State to brief Frank Wisner on his discussions in Pretoria, Harare, and London, and to share our heightened concern. Wisner seemed to share many of our worries. He has called an interagency meeting of Mozambique watchers for 5 June to discuss the situation.

5. We are getting in touch with Fred Wettering, [redacted] to see if he came back with the same gloomy message. At a minimum, I believe we need to re-examine the draft SNIE on [redacted]

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Mozambique that you recently reviewed. The current draft probably should be altered to account for the deteriorating situation. We will also try to include more speculation on several potential scenarios--including a pro-Soviet coup, a collapse of the Machel regime, or even a RENAMO victory with Machel or others in FRELIMO returning to the bush to fight on. The latter is particularly worrisome to Pretoria, which has no appetite for becoming the sugar daddy to a RENAMO government under siege from a FRELIMO insurgency supported by the black Africans and the Soviets.



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John L. Helgersen

All portions classified SECRET.

S-E-C-R-E-T

SENSITIVE
The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

NIC #03810-85

21 JUL 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Proposed CPPG Meeting on Southern Africa

1. I believe there is a need for the Crisis Pre-Planning Group to examine some of the specific policies and tactics applicable to the southern Africa region. While the 26 July NSC meeting underscored continuing consensus on the broad policy objectives towards South Africa and southern Africa, some of the specific applications of these broad objectives seem to make a questionable contribution to the overall policy objectives. (S)

2. Policies of the past four years have led us to support a Marxist government in Mozambique against a growing insurgency which controls most of the country and to jeopardize the popular leader of an insurgency against a Communist government in Angola in order to accelerate a political process in Namibia which is likely to install a Marxist government there. (S)

3. Specifically, in Angola, the complete withdrawal of Cuban troops would result in the collapse of the MPLA government and a victory for Savimbi. Thus, the MPLA, the Soviet Union, and Cuba will not go for any such deal. The latest version of our proposal--a somewhat exiguous plan for an extended Cuban withdrawal over three years, referred to as "the synthesis"--has been rejected by the MPLA, UNITA, and South Africa (as well as Cuba and the Soviet Union). Incredibly, the blame for the impasse has passed from the Communists to the South Africans, which is against our intention and interest. (S)

4. There is broad agreement in the Intelligence Community that the only pressure capable of moving the MPLA into dealing with Savimbi and dispensing with its Cuban guardians is greatly increased military pressure from UNITA. (S)

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5. The SWAPO movement, the likely beneficiary of a Namibia settlement, appears increasingly weakened by inter- and intra-tribal conflicts and by military defeats, but its ties to the Soviet Bloc appear even stronger. Meanwhile, South African attempts to construct a moderate political grouping in Namibia capable of challenging SWAPO in any election remain unsupported

[REDACTED]

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6. In Mozambique, a recent SNIE noted that the insurgent RENAMO movement would continue to drive the Machel regime into smaller and smaller islands of control over the next year. (S)

7. I believe the CPPG should examine new policy options for the southern Africa region. I would suggest the following be among the options examined:

- Shift our diplomatic efforts from Cuban troop withdrawal in Angola to proposals for reconciliation meetings between MPLA and UNITA, as both Savimbi and the South Africans have encouraged us to do. While the MPLA would likely resist this at first, it would again return the world focus on MPLA inflexibility rather than South Africa's, and could provide a framework for actual talks should increased pressure from Savimbi broaden the limited sentiment for talks extant within the MPLA.
- [REDACTED]

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- Give Savimbi the legitimacy he deserves and desires, by agreeing (as we did in December 1981) to a new visit by Savimbi to the United States where he would be received at senior levels.

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SECRET WNINTEL

- Rather than sending new missions to Luanda with new formulations on Cuban withdrawal--moves which discomfort and weaken Savimbi and produce no results--should we not wait for battlefield pressures to move the MPLA to come to us? We should not categorically exclude ourselves from contacts with the MPLA, however.

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/s/ William J. Casey

William J. Casey

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S E C R E T

Topics for DCI/Chief of Staff Meeting on 15 June 1985

SECTION I: Introduction

While the Soviet Union and Libya suffered some reverses in Africa in the mid 1980s, mostly due to their inability to provide significant economic assistance, these two nations and their surrogates, have continued to operate aggressively on the continent in seeking to expand their political and military influence. The Soviets have demonstrated a serious commitment to retain their foothold in Angola and Ethiopia and to improve their position in other parts of Africa. Libya has moved equally aggressively resulting in success in such areas as Chad, the Sudan, Burundi, Niger, Zaire and Nigeria. In 1984 the USSR promised more than one half billion dollars in economic development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa, ninety percent of it destined for the socialist states. We estimate nine thousand Soviet economic technicians were in sub-Saharan Africa in 1984. Soviet military deliveries to sub-Saharan Africa in 1984 were valued at U.S. \$1.7 billion and there were four thousand eight hundred Soviet military technicians in sub-Saharan Africa that year.

SECTION II: Soviet and Libyan Initiatives and Threat in Africa

In the Horn of Africa the most prominent example of Soviet initiatives and ensuing threat to U.S. interests is Ethiopia. There are about three thousand Soviet advisors serving primarily with key military and intelligence units. The Soviet Bloc is the primary source of Ethiopia's military equipment and training needs. In December 1984, a Treaty of Friendship was signed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Ethiopia's "vanguard Marxist-Leninist party," the Ethiopian Workers Party.

In Sudan the Libyans are currently arming the Sudanese Revolutionary Committees and inciting them to act against the current regime. The Libyan objective is to install a more radical, anti-West regime and drive a wedge between Sudan and Egypt. Sudanese terrorist Abdullah Zakariah returned from Tripoli to Khartoum the day Sudanese-Libyan relations were restored with about one hundred of his armed followers.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

The Libyans have provided financial and military assistance to southern Sudanese dissident leader John Garang and will probably continue to do so as leverage with the new Sudanese leadership. The Soviets have arranged delivery of forty-eight tons of military equipment to Garang in Ethiopia through its regional ally, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

In neighboring Chad, Libya has occupied one third of the country with about five thousand troops since 1982 and continues to try to overthrow the pro-West government of Hissein Habre by funneling money and materiel to anti-Habre dissidents in northern and southern Chad. Libya also furnishes weapons to Chadian dissidents through the territory of Chad's central African neighbors: Cameroon, The Central African Republic and The Congo. Libyan assassination attempts against President Habre have been uncovered.

Romanian arms recently arrived in Somalia. The Somalis appear to be courting the Soviets, although Soviet assistance to rival Ethiopia remains a stumbling block to closer relations between the two countries. Until the recent reestablishment of Somali-Libyan relations, Libya openly provided support to Somali dissidents. Despite his agreement to halt such aid, Qadhafi has promised continued support to the dissidents.

In southern Africa, the Soviets are reemphasizing their ties to the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) to demonstrate the importance of the Soviet role in southern Africa. In addition to Soviet support, SWAPO receives assistance from Libya. The Libyans have recently trained SWAPO troops in Libya and supplied SWAPO with weapons and arms.

South Africa is a high priority target for the Soviet Union. Although there is no formal Soviet presence there, the USSR has cultivated such liberation groups as the Africa National Congress (ANC), the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) and provides arms and training to the ANC and SACP. Soviet Bloc intelligence services also funnel financial and military support through the liberation committees of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations.

The Soviets have been providing Mozambique with a significant amount of military hardware and recently signed a new economic agreement with that country. Intelligence reporting also indicates that the Soviets are involved in coup plotting against the Machel government, primarily through Marxist hardliners within the government.

S E C R E T

Elsewhere in southern Africa, the Soviet Union is actively engaged in efforts to influence public opinion in Zimbabwe through influential members of the local media. Through Botswana the USSR maintains peripheral contact with the ANC and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania. In Lesotho, there has been a notable increase in communist placement of items in the local media in the last year. Lesotho also receives arms from the Soviet Bloc.

In the Central African region, the main bastion of Soviet influence and action, is Angola. Their influence is derived mainly through military assistance. Since 1976 nearly all of Angola's weapons and military equipment has come from the Soviet Bloc since 1976. In 1984 alone, the Soviets provided an estimated \$850 million worth of military hardware including weapons of increasing sophistication and advanced fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft. There are about one thousand seven hundred Soviet and Bloc military personnel in Angola in technical, training, internal security and intelligence capacities. In return, the Soviets have obtained access to facilities for reconnaissance flights over the south Atlantic and permanent stationing of vessels at Luanda Port. Soviet surrogate Cuba has about thirty-five thousand military personnel in Angola.

Despite the anti-Soviet posture of Zairian President Mobutu, the Soviets have made efforts to subvert/influence elements of the Zairian populace through travel and study programs and cultural events. The Zairian government, however, keeps a close watch on Zairians in contact with Soviets. The Libyans, however, have been supporting a variety of dissident groups, including a number based in Tanzania, with that government's knowledge and consent. Evidence of increasing Libyan support to the dissidents in the last several years points to the possibility of increased training and arms aid. The Libyans may have succeeded in forming a more viable coalition of dissident organizations.

In neighboring Burundi, the Soviets have been supplying military materiel since early 1983. In May 1985, Libyan leader Qadhafi made a two-day unannounced visit to Burundi during which he reaffirmed his support for Burundi President Bagaza and verbally attacked Zairian President Mobutu. There is reporting that Qadhafi provided Burundi over U.S. \$50 million and agreed to renew arms shipments. After the Burundi visit, Qadhafi continued his public denigration of Mobutu in Rwanda. That government hastened to assure the West that Qadhafi had not been invited and that Rwandan policy toward Libya had not changed.

S E C R E T

In the important East African nation of Kenya, President Moi is very concerned about Libyan activities in the Horn and other parts of Africa. There are now six Libyan-sponsored Islamic Call Society (ICS) regional committees in Kenya. Their primary purpose is to propagate Islam, but Qadhafi has used them to advance his revolutionary concepts. The Kenyans continue to be skeptical and basically suspicious of Soviet intentions and have required them to maintain a low profile. Nevertheless, the Nairobi University Study Organization is an affiliate of the Soviet Front International Union of Students (IUS) and is a member of the IUS Executive Committee. The Kenyans have evidence of a Soviet link to the early 1985 student unrest at the university. The Soviets are providing some political and financial support to Kenyan dissidents resident in Zimbabwe and their support to Kenyan dissidents abroad is well known.

In Tanzania, the Soviets are well entrenched and their primary goal is to encourage the Tanzanian government to maintain its socialist political orientation. The Soviets have provided extensive military assistance and training for the Tanzanian People's Defense Force. The Soviets probably have an agent of influence at the senior level of the government. The Soviet relationship with the Tanzanian Intelligence and Security Service (TISS) has been a vehicle for disinformation fed to the Tanzanian government, including allegations of wrongdoing by the U.S. Government. The Soviets and their Cuban surrogates have offered on more than one occasion to help TISS expose all U.S. intelligence personnel and their activities in Tanzania.

The Soviets exercise a dominant influence in the Seychelles in the military, educational and technical areas. Key Seychelles government officials, including President Rene, are Marxists. The Soviets have use of Seychelles military facilities. There is Soviet influence in the government-controlled media. The Soviet proxy North Koreans serve as military advisors to the defense forces.

In Madagascar, the Soviets have played heavily on Malagasy President Ratsiraka's desire to stay in power and his fear of South Africa to become the primary supplier of military equipment and training for the Malagasy.

In West Africa, the Nigerians have allowed the Libyans to reestablish an embassy. Libyan agents have been dispatched to spread Qadhafi's doctrine and Libya has requested permission to reopen an Islamic studies center in the predominantly Moslem Kano region.

S E C R E T

In Niger there has been a recent indication that dissidents may be receiving Libyan backing for a possible coup. The Libyans are known to be building an airfield just north of the Nigerian/Libyan border.

In Mauritania, the Libyans have provided several billions of dollars for construction and development projects. They are trying to involve themselves in education and cultural areas and are seeking to reopen its people's bureau. There has been a recent indication of possible Libyan involvement in a coup plot in the military.

In Benin, there are about one hundred and fifty Soviets resident. Libyan-Beninese relations have been close since the mid-1970s, but have cooled over Libya's failure to deliver promised economic assistance. Benin is a transit point for Chadian dissidents en route to Libya. Two Libyan-sponsored Islamic conferences will take place in Benin in 1985.

The Soviets have a two hundred and thirty person presence in the small country of Guinea Bissau and are highly influential in the military assistance and cultural areas. In February 1984 Guinea Bissau and Libya negotiated, and may have signed, a military pact for overflights, military security and training.

Senegalese President Diouf is suspicious of Soviet intentions in West Africa and he limits the Soviets to education and cultural activities. Yet, the one hundred and ten person Soviet Embassy is Moscow's regional West African headquarters. There are indications of Soviet support to Senegal's two larger Marxist opposition parties. Senegalese labor and youth are in touch with Soviet international organizations in these fields. In about 1981 Libya provided paramilitary training to Senegal's largest Marxist opposition party.

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